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I. INTRODUCTIONC YBERSPACE HAS opened virtual product development in
the air transport industry, giving commercial air carriers the
opportunity to conduct business through the Internet. The In-
ternet explosion, occurring largely in the last three years of the
1990s, was due to three fundamental factors: (1) deregulation of
telecommunications; (2) globalization; and (3) the acceptance
of an Internet protocol as a de facto standard.' When the con-
cept of electronic commerce (e-commerce) is applied to the av-
erage contract of carriage between the airline and the
passenger, what immediately comes to mind are concerns re-
lated to the centuries-long practice of the exchange of paper-
based documents. Paper-based documents have been the pre-
dominant means of recording commercial information pertain-
ing to contracts between parties.
Ironically, the Internet explosion, which resulted in e-com-
merce, brings to bear a certain "back-to-basics" approach from a
legal perspective. For centuries, before a documented form of
contract was formally recognized as a valid means of recording a
* The author is a senior official in the International Civil Aviation
Organization. He has written this article in his personal capacity.
I See Ian Shepphard, Cyberspace, AEROSPACE INT'L, May 2000, at 24.
1345
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
contract, the world frowned upon the somewhat widespread
practice of entering into oral contracts, particularly in the case
of certain types of agreements. This difficulty was obviated
under English law with the enactment of the Statute of Frauds.2
This legislation established the basic requirement of a contract
having to be established in writing, at least in the instance of
particular contracts. Although the Statute was repealed in 1954,
its principles subsist in some common law jurisdictions. The re-
quirement of a "writing," as envisioned in the Statute of Frauds,
was arguably a stipulation for words and figures written in ink
on paper (the prevalent means of putting things on paper at the
time), and therefore left a perceived lacuna in the law on the
issue of telegraphic contracts, which became popular in the
mid-19th Century. When faced with the question as to whether
a telegraph message containing an offer and another reflecting
acceptance would constitute a "writing" as required by statutes,
common-law jurisdictions3 achieved consensus in finding that a
telegram constituted a written agreement.
Courts even went to the extent of accepting a telephone mes-
sage, conveyed by one of the parties to the contract to a phone
clerk at the telegraph company, and later transcribed by the
clerk into telegraphic form, as satisfying the criterion for a "writ-
ten" agreement. In the 1918 seminal American case Selma Sav-
ings Bank v. Webster County Bank,4 the court, dismissing as
unimportant the mechanical means of making and signing the
writing as a determinant, followed the principle enunciated in
an earlier case which held:
[W] hen a contract is made by telegraph, which must be in writ-
ing by the Statute of Frauds, if the parties authorize their agents
either in writing or by parol, to make a proposition on one side
and the other party accepts it through the telegraph, that consti-
tutes a contract in writing ... because each party authorizes his
agents; the company or the company's operator, to write for him;
and it makes no difference whether that operator writes the offer
2 The original Statute of Frauds, passed in 1677 by Charles II, was intended as
an act for the prevention of frauds and injuries. See Douglas Stollery, Statute of
Frauds, 14 ALTA. L. REv. 222 (1976).
3 For Canadian law, see Kinghorne v. Montreal Tel. Co., [1859] 18 U.C.Q.B. 60.
For British law, see McBlain v. Cross, 25 L.T.R. 804 (C.P. 1871) and Coupland v.
Arrowsmith, 18 L.T.R. 755 (V.C. 1868). For United States law, see Howley v. Whip-
p/e, 48 N.H. 487 (1869). For general reading, see S. WALTER JONES, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES (2d ed. 1916).
4 206 S.W. 870, 872 (Ky. 1918).
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or acceptance in the presence of his principal and by his express
direction.5
This approach reflects a strong judicial predilection, even at
that early stage, to accommodate new developments in technol-
ogy. It is encouraging that, with the acknowledgement of the
first dynamic of computer law that technological advancement
would be purposeless without due recognition of its efficacy,
courts have pioneered a sensible approach with predictable
ramifications.
The telecopier followed the telegram, and the courts followed
the path cleared through the telegraph cases. In a 1988 ruling,
a Canadian court ruled:
[T]he law has endeavoured to take cognizance of, and to be re-
ceptive to, technological advances in the means of communica-
tion. The conduct of business has for many years been enhanced
by technological improvements in communication. Those im-
provements should not be rejected automatically when attempts
are made to apply them to matters involving the law. They
should be considered and, unless there are compelling reasons
for rejection, they should be encouraged, applied and
approved.6
A subsequent case, which pertained to a fax transmission, en-
dorsed the previous view, urging encouragement and approval
of contracts made through the electronic media.7 This com-
monsensical approach may well be extended all the way to in-
stances of computer-to-computer transactions (popularly called
electronic data interchange) involving e-commerce conducted
through electronic mail (e-mail).
In the case of the carriage of passengers and cargo by air, e-
commerce is becoming an increasingly popular medium of
transaction. However, air carriage raises esoteric issues of liabil-
ity brought about by a complex web of legal requirements per-
taining to the delivery of the document evidencing the contract
of carriage. This article will examine some of those legal issues.
5 Howley, 48 N.H. at 488.
6 Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 & Co., [19881 25 B.C.L.R.2d 377.
7 Rolling v. Willann Invs. Ltd., [1989] 70 O.R.2d 578, 581.
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II. THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE BY AIR
A. ENCRYPTION
When a contract of carriage by air is entered into through e-
commerce, the most fundamental process of an electronic con-
tract-encryption-has to take place. In this context, an e-com-
merce contract for carriage by air is not dissimilar to any other
e-commerce transaction. Without encryption, e-commerce is
not only nearly impossible, but also insecure at best. When one
buys something online, such as an airline ticket using a "secure
server," his private information will be encrypted before it is sent
over the Internet. Similarly, when one conducts Internet bank-
ing, the bank concerned uses encryption to make private finan-
cial information unreadable to anyone but that bank.
"Encryption" is a set of complex mathematical formulae that
permit anyone transmitting electronic information to scramble
the message so that only the intended recipient can decode it
and thus understand it. Encryption is essential for e-commerce
because e-commerce largely takes place over the Internet, which
is an open network. As a practical matter, this means that some-
body other than the intended recipient of information can in-
tercept it and read it. Encryption protects such information as
credit card numbers and all other private information sent
through the Internet.
There are several ways to learn whether a browser used for an
e-commerce transaction is encrypting information. For exam-
ple, when one purchases something online using Netscape's
browser, if the picture of a lock in the lower left-hand corner is
in the locked position with a glow around it, proper encryption
is being ensured. One can also look at the Internet address of
where his browser is. If, for instance, it starts with "https" in-
stead of just "http," it means that the browser is using a secure
server that uses encryption.
The basic concept of how one encrypts information is simple:
a computer program uses an encryption algorithm (essentially a
mathematical equation), which converts the intended data (con-
fidential files, credit card number, etc.) into an encoded mes-
sage using a key (think of the "key" as your password for
decoding or deciphering the message). The result of the en-
cryption process is that the plain-text message comes out the
other end unreadable because it looks like gibberish.
Encryption comes in two basic forms. One uses a single key
(or password) and the other uses dual keys. With single-key en-
1348
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cryption, the key is used to encode information, which is then
sent to the intended recipient. The recipient then uses this
same key to decipher the encrypted message. This means that
the sender of information has to share the secret key with the
recipient. A grave concern with this process is that the sender
will need a secure way to share the key. This limits the useful-
ness of single-key encryption in e-commerce because it is rarely
practical to whisper the key into someone's ear when one is con-
ducting business online.
On the other hand, dual-key encryption is the prominent
player in e-commerce. This system provides two mathematically
related keys to work with. One is called the "public key" and the
other is called the "private key." The public key is a key that can
and should be announced to the world. The sender can post it
on a Web site or put it in a newspaper advertisement. It is a
public document and, therefore, not a secret. When someone
wishes to send a confidential message that only an intended re-
cipient should read, the sender can encrypt it using this public
key. For instance, if a consumer wishes to send a credit card
number to Utopiaairlines.com, the browser might encrypt the
number using Utopiaairlines.com's public key.
The interesting part of this two-way process is that if a thief
intercepts a credit card number over the Internet and tries to
decode it using Utopiaairlines.com's public key, it will not work.
The advantage of a dual-key system is that the public key is a
one-way key. It encrypts information, but it will not decrypt it.
That is the reason it is not important for a sender of information
to keep the public key a secret. When Utopia Airlines wants to
read the consumer's credit card number, Utopiaairlines.com's
private key is used to decrypt or decode the information. The
private key must remain absolutely secret: it allows someone to
read messages intended only for them and encrypted using their
public key.
B. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Usually, a contract is concluded when, in response to an offer
made by an offeror, the offeree indicates an acceptance to the
offeror. In cases of simultaneous communication of the offer
and acceptance, made face-to-face by the offeror and offeree,
the essentials of a contract are clear. However, when parties are
not in close proximity to each other and communicate their
dealings over the telecommunications medium, the process may
become slightly more complicated, in that it may not always be
2001] 1349
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clear as to what constitutes an offer or an acceptance. In such
instances, it largely becomes a matter of interpretation as to
whether both the offeror and the offeree had the intent to con-
clude the contract.
The element of intent to contract and to conclude the process
on the part of both the offeror and offeree is inceptive to the
formation of the contract. Courts have insisted that proof of an
offer to enter into legal relations upon definite terms must be
followed by the production of evidence from which the courts
may infer an intention by the offeree to accept that offer. Thus,
the statements made by the parties in the process of negotia-
tions are of extreme importance in the determination of a con-
cluded contract. The 1840 case of Hyde v. Wrench8 offers the
principle that a series of communications from either party may
impinge an original offer. In Hyde, the defendant, on June 6,
offered to sell an estate to the plaintiff for £1,000. OnJune 8, in
reply, the plaintiff made an offer of £950, which was refused by
the defendant on June 27. However, on June 29, the plaintiff
wrote to the defendant that he was now willing to pay £1,000.
The importance of the Hyde decision lies in the fact the court
held that no contract existed. The plaintiff, by rejecting the of-
fer made on June 6, had precluded himself from reviving the
offer later. In other words, once an offer is rejected, the offeree
cannot assume that the offer will still stand in its original form.
In the instance of a sale carried out over the Internet, it is
important to note that by placing its seats for sale on the In-
ternet, an airline is placing itself in the same position as a shop
owner who displays his goods for sale in his shop with price tags
marked on the goods. By doing so, the shop owner is merely
making an invitation for an offer. The buyer who walks into the
shop and selects an item for purchase is making the offer, which
the shop owner is entitled to accept or reject. Similarly, it is the
purchaser of the airline ticket over the Internet who makes the
offer, making him the offeror and the airline the offeree.
The primary issue at stake in the determination of a contract
is whether the parties intended the contract to be concluded.
For instance, if a person offers to buy an airline ticket over the
Internet and the airline gives that person a reference number,
the allocation of that number might not necessarily indicate an
acceptance of the offer by the airline. The 1989 United States
case of Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems, Inc. v. Lederle Laborato-
8 3 Beav. 334 (1840).
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tie? provides a good analogy. A person dealing in medicinal
drugs on a wholesale basis ordered a consignment of drugs
through a computerized telephone ordering system. The order
was placed strategically a day before a price increase was to take
effect. The wholesaler ordered through the manufacturer's au-
tomated telephone order system. After the wholesaler placed
the order message, he was allocated a "tracking number" by the
manufacturer's computer system. There was absolutely no
human interaction in the transaction. Subsequently, when the
manufacturer refused to sell the consignment of drugs as or-
dered by the wholesaler at the pre-increase price, the court held
with the manufacturer's position that the tracking number is-
sued by the manufacturer's computer was not an acceptance of
the offer but merely an acknowledgment of the receipt of the
order-or an offer in contractual law terms. The court con-
cluded that no contract had been concluded, and the whole-
saler was denied the purchase of the goods at the lower price.
The early case of Henkel v. Pape° brings out another difficulty
that might arise from contracts transacted through the Internet.
The Henkel case, decided in 1870, concerned a transaction car-
ried out through telegraphic messages for the sale of up to fifty
rifles. The offeror sent the offeree a telegraphic message offer-
ing to buy three rifles, but the message was transcripted to the
offeree as 'the' instead of "three" rifles. Accordingly, the offeree
held the offeror liable for the purchase of all fifty rifles. The
court held that the offeror could not be held liable for the error
of the telegraph clerk who had wrongly deciphered the mes-
sage, and therefore, no contract had been concluded. 1
The principle underlying the Henkle decision still holds water
where a contract is transacted over the Internet. As in Henkle,
Internet transactions involve a contract negotiated through elec-
tronic means where there is always the risk that messages in-
tending to create contractual obligations may not reach their
destination or, perhaps more ominous, messages are received by
the recipient in a form other than the one sent by the sender.
In the 1859 Canadian case of Kinghorne v. Montreal Telegraph
Co.,12 the court articulated the reasons behind the determina-
tion of an electronic contract. These reasons still may apply:
9 724 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
10 23 L.T.R. 419 (Ex. 1870).
H1 See also, Harper v. W. Union Tel. Co., 130 S.E. 119 (S.C. 1925); Postal Tel.
Cable Co. v. Schaefer, 62 S.W. 1119 (Ky. 1901).
12 [1859] 18 U.C.Q.B. 60.
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We must look, I think, in the case of each communication, at the
papers delivered by the party who sent the message, not at the
transcript of the message taken through the wire at the other end
of the wire, with all the chances of mistakes in apprehending and
noting the signals, and in transcribing for delivery.
13
Of course, compared to early telegraph systems that caused
numerous problems, the modern Internet is more reliable, and
errors such as those encountered in Henkle or Kinghorne may not
be commonplace. However, there is the possibility of garbled
messages flowing through the Internet; courts likely would have
no hesitation in determining the real intent of the parties to
conclude a contract as the preliminary issue.
The above concerns are by no means intended to suggest that
contracts through the Internet are questionable in general
terms. In fact, current computer-based technologies are more
effective than earlier technologies at assisting parties to the con-
tract to conclude their agreement unambiguously. For exam-
ple, electronic data interchange (EDI) as a commercial medium
has evolved in Canada to the extent that the EDI Council of
Canada's Model TPA encourages parties to be extremely precise
in identifying particular messages as constituting an order (or
offer) by introducing a two-phased process: the first using a
functional acknowledgment of the offer (such as the tracking
number in the Corinthian case), and the second using a
purchase-order acknowledgment.
C. TIME AND PLACE OF CONTRACT
There is no doubt as to when and where the contract comes
into being when parties sign a contract simultaneously in a face-
to-face setting. On the other hand, it is often not a trivial legal
task to determine when and where a contract comes into being
when either an offer, or an acceptance, or both, are sent by tele-
graph, telex, fax, EDI, e-mail, over the Internet, or by telephone.
The uncertainty began even before the advent of the telegraph
with the mail delivery system. The general contract law princi-
ple is that an offer is not considered accepted until the accept-
ance of the offer is received by the offeror. In 19th-Century
England, an exception to this rule was developed by judges for
offers and acceptances sent by the mail. The so-called post-box
rule or expedition theory prescribes that where an offer is made
in the mail, the contract takes effect immediately at the time the
13 Id. at 66.
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acceptance is posted in the mail (rather than when the accept-
ance is actually received by the offeror) where use of the mail is
reasonable in the circumstances or expressly contemplated by
the parties. This rule effectively precludes the need to hold the
offeree responsible for delays in communications and places the
burden of uncertainty during the waiting period on the offeror.
That is, the offeror does not know that it has concluded a bind-
ing contract until it receives the offeree's acceptance in the
mail, whereas the offeree knew the contract came into existence
the moment it posted its reply letter. Shifting this risk to the
offeror and giving the concomitant assurance to the offeree was
reasonable because of the increased reliability of the Royal Mail
in the 1800s to the point where multiple deliveries each day in
larger urban centres were the norm. The expedition theory is a
good example of a legal doctrine being firmly grounded in the
communication environment and commercial processes of its
day.
As the telegraph, telephone, and other new communications
technology evolved into widespread use, cases established prin-
ciples as to when and where contracts were concluded. In the
early Canadian case of Carow Towing Co. v. The Ed. McWilliams,'4
the court held that a contract entered into by telephone should
be treated like a letter and should follow the expedition theory
with acceptance occurring at the place the acceptance is spoken
and not where the offeror hears the acceptance. By contrast, in
Entores L.D. v. Miles Far East Corp.,15 a later British decision, Lord
Denning concluded that for simultaneous communications like
the telephone, the place where the contract is concluded is
where the offeror hears the acceptance, and thus, if the line
goes dead during the telephone conversation, the onus is upon
the offeree to call back the offeror to ensure the words of ac-
ceptance had been communicated to the offeror. Subsequent
cases in Canada have followed the decision in Entores rather
than the approach in Carow Towing,16 with the exception of Que-
bec where, until recently, the preponderance of case law has fol-
lowed the principle that telephone contracts arise when and
14 [1919] 46 D.L.R. 506 (Ex. Ct.).
15 [1955] 2 Q.B. 327 (Eng. C.A.).
16 See, e.g., McDonald & Sons Ltd. v. Exp. Packers Co. [1979], 95 D.L.R. 3d 174
(B.C.); see also Re Viscount Supply Co., [1963] 40 D.L.R. 2d 501 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
Bankr.); Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Chance, [1996] 30 O.R.3d 746.
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where the offeree speaks the acceptance.17 Since the enactment
of the current Civil Code of Quebec in January 1994, Article
1387 explicitly provides that, with telephone contracts, accept-
ance occurs when and where the acceptance is received. It is
interesting to note that the Entores decision was also followed in
two fax cases, one in Nova Scotia' 8 and one in New Zealand,19
where each held that a contract made by fax arises when the
offeror receives by fax the acceptance of the offered.
The Entores court also held that telex technology involves in-
stantaneous communications with the result that acceptance oc-
curs when the message is received by the offeror. This approach
was confirmed by the House of Lords in the Brinkibon case.2 0 In
this case, the court held that, although telex communications
should be categorized as simultaneous, the specific constituent
elements and factors in the communications system need to be
carefully considered:
The senders and recipients may not be the principals to the con-
templated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited
authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach,
the designated recipient immediately; messages may be sent out
of office hours, or at night, with the intention, or on the assump-
tion, that they will be read at a later time. There may be some
error or default at the recipient's end which prevents receipt at
the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The mes-
sage may have been sent and/or received through machines op-
erated by third persons. And many other variations may occur.
No universal rule can cover all such cases; they must be resolved
by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business
practice and in some cases by ajudgment where the risks should
lie.2 '
The recognition of the above facts in Brinkibon raises a num-
ber of emerging issues with respect to EDI, e-mail, and Internet
communications. Certain EDI transmissions, for example, will
fall into the 'simultaneous communications' category. Much
EDI is effected not between the trading principals, however, but
by use of intermediaries, so-called value-added networks (VAN)
17 See Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Bonavista Fabrics Ltd., [1984] C.A. 52
(Que. C.A.).
18 Joan Balcom Sales Inc. v. Poirier, [1991] 28 A.C.W.S. 3d 551 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
19 See Gunac Hawkes Bay (1986) Ltd. v. Palmer [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 297.
20 See Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl & Stahlwarenhandels-Gesellschaft M.B.H.,
[1982] 1 All E.R. 293 (H.L.).
21 See id. at 296.
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or service providers. An EDI message could likely go through
the message sender's VAN, then through the recipient's VAN,
and finally to the recipient. Similarly, e-mail messages over the
Internet may be routed to electronic mailboxes from which the
recipient must then download. In such instances, it may be
more difficult to conclude that the simultaneous communica-
tion rules should apply. Also, it may be difficult to determine
when exactly an electronic message arrives at the recipient's lo-
cation for purposes of being recognized as legally effective. For
instance, an early British case held that a letter sent in a sealed
envelope is not considered received until it is opened by the
addressee personally. 2 Whether such a rule should apply in the
case of e-mail, or whether an e-mail message should be deemed
received when it is available to be viewed by the intended recipi-
ent regardless of the time at which the recipient actually reads
the message is a moot point. Another question involves when a
telex or fax should be deemed to have arrived at a workplace.
In one case, the answer pointed to when the message was re-
ceived by the recipient's machine (on a Friday after business
hours and not three days later on a Monday morning when a
person actually reads the telex).23
Given these ambiguities, prudent users of electronic com-
merce should try to avoid having to refer these issues to a judge
by providing, in their EDI trading partner agreement (TPA) or
other similar document, precisely what electronic message must
be received by which computer-such as the recipient's or the
recipient's VAN-for a contract to arise, thereby bringing clarity
to the questions as to when the electronic contract arose. As to
the 'where' question, the parties to the TPA would be well ad-
vised to select a governing law in advance and make sure that
the VAN agreements contain the same jurisdiction so that there
is no question which law would apply if adjudication were ever
considered necessary. This is particularly true for EDI and In-
ternet transactions where each trading party's VAN or Internet
service provider may be in a jurisdiction different from the cus-
tomer, and therefore, the laws of four different jurisdictions pos-
sibly may apply if the parties remain silent on the governing law
question. In such circumstances, as Lord Denning observed in
Entores, which concerned two parties in different jurisdictions,
22 See Arrowsmith v. Ingle, [1810] 128 Eng. Rep. 93.
23 N.V. Stoomv Maats 'de Maas v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
56 (Q.B.).
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the problems arise because the laws of the respective jurisdic-
tions are different. Therefore, predicting a court's probable re-
sponse is difficult given that the court will invariably try to seek
the most just remedy under the circumstances, but in some
cases, this is truly a difficult task. As an example, the court's
commentary in Export Packers, where the judge recommended
that the various rules developed by the law over the years, such
as the simultaneous communication rule in the Entores case,
should not be applied in a rigid fashion:
When the common law rules relating to offer and acceptance
were under development the telephone did not exist. At that
time agreements were made by two or more persons getting to-
gether and reaching a common understanding. As the postal sys-
tem came into being elaborate rules were made by the courts
covering the mechanics of reaching a bargain by mail. Today a
person ordinarily resident in British Columbia may telephone
from Japan where he is on a business trip to a person ordinarily
resident in Ontario but who is also then visiting Italy. They may
agree to the same kind of contract which is the subject-matter of
this writ. It does not necessarily follow the place where the con-
tract was made was Japan and thatJapanese law governs its inter-
pretation. Alternatively, it would be hard to argue the place
where the contract was made was Italy and the law of that country
ought to apply to its interpretation. 4
This dictum clearly confirms the benefit accrued to users of
electronic commerce in crafting their own rules for dealing with
issues of contract formation. Making commercial relationships
more secure and predictable through contract, however, can be
a costly and time-consuming exercise. Therefore, this may be an
area for law reform. In the United States, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners of Uniform State Law is already working
toward establishing new rules under the Uniform Commercial
Code taking the view that Internet communications are instanta-
neous in nature, and, therefore, a contract comes into existence
when the sender of the offer receives an electronic message sig-
nifying acceptance. This does not, however, answer the ques-
tion as to when the acceptance is effective if the offeror was not
present before the computer. In other words, whether receipt
requires human intervention and acknowledgement. In deter-
mining this question, the following should be observed: (1) the
purpose and function of the rule; (2) who would be prejudiced




by a particular holding; (3) what are the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties; and (4) on whom is it reasonable to place a
burden for helping to "fix"' the system if indeed it needs it.
D. DELIVERY OF THE AIRLINE TICKET
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 states that, for the transpor-
tation of passengers, the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket
containing certain details5.2  The Convention also says that the
absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not af-
fect the existence of the validity of the contract of transporta-
tion, which shall nonetheless be subject to the rules of the
Convention. Yet, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a pas-
senger ticket having been delivered, he shall not be entitled to
avail himself of those provisions of the Convention that exclude
his liability.26 Article 3 of the Convention provides that the in-
formation contained in the ticket delivered to the passenger
must contain the place and date of issue, the place of departure
and destination, agreed stopping places, name and address of
the carrier or carriers, and a statement that carriage is subject to
the liability provisions of the Convention.
The issue of "delivery" of an airline ticket to a person who
contracts with an airline for travel is significant in air law. Two
cases, Lisi v. Alitialia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. 27 and Chan v. Ko-
rean Air Lines Ltd.,28 clearly demonstrate that the meaning of
"delivery" in relation to the Convention is indeed important.
The important issue is not the "physical" delivery of the docu-
ment of carriage, but the "purpose" of delivery of the ticket to
the passenger. In this sense, both cases contain similar facts,
and in both cases, the respective tickets were "delivered" to the
passengers. The issue, however, was whether the ticket served its
purpose as envisaged by the courts, vis d vis Article 3 of the Con-
vention. A very important point in this connection is that both
cases, and, indeed, the precedent cursus curiae, were subject to
judicial "surgery" in the interpretation of the meaning and pur-
pose of Article 3 of the Convention and that a discussion of the
25 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, art. 3.1, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
26 Id. at art. 3.2.
27 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
28 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
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two decisions would be meaningless if their history were not
briefly outlined.
Miller succinctly sums up the purpose of Article 3 when she
says:
Delivery is no longer the physical delivery of the ticket by the
carrier. The requirement is qualified in such a way that the deliv-
ery must allow the passenger [i] to realise that the carrier's liabil-
ity is greatly limited and [ii] if he so wishes, to buy additional
insurance. In other words, there must be adequate notice of the
liability limitations. 29
The judicial arguments in the United States (where both
these cases were decided) are based on the fact that courts have
imputed to the carrier, the breach of the Convention by "nonde-
livery" of the ticket in the case that the ticket is physically deliv-
ered but does not give the passenger the opportunity to read its
contents, although Article 3(1) (e) expressly provides that "a
statement that the carriage is subject to the rules of the Conven-
tion must be included in the ticket" thereby precluding any
need for imputation of liability 0 By bringing the case under
"non delivery" under Article 3.2, the courts effectively veer the
case into the realm of sanctions, which entails the all-important
question of unlimited liability of the carrier."
The predecessors to the Lisi and Chan decisions held that fail-
ure to give adequate notice of the liability limitation, amounting
to the absence of delivery of the ticket, has been addressed and
recognized in instances where either the ticket was not physi-
cally delivered at all or where the passenger receives his ticket
but does not have the opportunity to read its contents such that
he has sufficient time to take necessary action (such as obtain
additional insurance coverage for himself) .32 These cases in-
volved instances where the passenger ticket was handed over to
the passenger at the stairs to the aircraft, just before boarding,
and after the passenger had boarded the aircraft, respectively.
The Lisi case added a new twist to the circumstances by chal-
lenging the United States Court of Appeals to address the issue
of the ticket being delivered under normal circumstances, but
the passenger being precluded from reading its contents, owing
29 GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE WAR-
SAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 84 (1980).
30 Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, at art. 3(1)(e).
31 MILLER, supra note 29.
32 See Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
1358
AIRLINE E-COMMERCE
to the very small print used in the ticket. The Court of Appeals,
recalling its Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. decision, stated:
We read Article 3(2) to require that the ticket be delivered to the
passenger in such a manner as to afford him a reasonable oppor-
tunity to take measures to protect himself against the limitation
of liability....
* . . The Convention's arbitrary limitations of liability... are ad-
vantageous to the carrier. But the quid pro quo for this one-
sided advantage is delivery to the passenger of a ticket.., which
give[s] him notice that on the air trip he is about to take, the
amount of recovery to him ... is limited very substantially. .... 3
Justice MacMahon criticized the ticket's small print stating
that the conditions of carriage were "'camouflaged in Lillipu-
tian print in a thicket of "Conditions of Contract" . . .' 4 and
unequivocally decided that the ticket had not been delivered to
the passenger in the context of Article 3 of the Convention. In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Moore, on the other hand, called the
pronouncement by the majority 'judicial treaty-making," where
the court has attempted to "rewrite" the Convention. 35 Accord-
ing to Justice Moore, the language of the Treaty was clear, and
its parameters were clearly stated.
Chan v. Korean Air took a diametrically opposed stance by stat-
ing that:
All that the second sentence of Article 3(2) requires in order to
avoid its sanction is the "deliver[y]" of "a passenger ticket." Ex-
panding this to mean "a passenger ticket in compliance with the
requirements of [the] Convention" is rendered implausible by
the first sentence of Article 3(2), which specifies that "[t]he ir-
regularity... shall not affect the ... validity of the contract... 36
The court in this instance followed a previous decision3 7 and
held that a contract exists even if the ticket is absent or "irregu-
lar," and the contract was still governed by all the provisions of
the Convention. 8
33 Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A, 370 F.2d 508, 512-13 (2d Cir.
1966) (quoting Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 856 (2d Cir.
1965)) (emphasis in original).
34 Id. at 514 (quoting Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp.
237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
35 Id. at 515 (Moore, J., dissenting).
36 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (quoting Warsaw
Convention, supra note 25, at art. 3(2)).
37 Ludecke v. Can. Pac. Airlines Ltd., [1979] 98 D.L.R. 3d. 52 (Can.).
38 Chan, 490 U.S. at 132-133.
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It must be noted that while the Lisi case dealt with a ticket
with a 4-point print, the Chan case dealt with an 8-point print,
making it imaginable that the majority in the former case would
have been influenced by the minuscule print. It is also notewor-
thy that the 10-point print prescribed for the passenger ticket,
which was authoritatively considered by the court in the latter,
was set by the Montreal Agreement of 1966-a private agree-
ment between airlines and not an international treaty. Valerie
Kaiser criticizes the Chan decision on the grounds that the court
was inconsistent in terminology39 and used an interpretation of
the treaty while claiming to follow strictly the provisions of the
Convention. Citing a subsequent case, 4° she concludes that
courts should not indulge in 'Judicial treaty or law making"
(presumably implying that treaties have to be adhered to stricto
sensu). It is indeed relevant in this instance to inquire whether
the principles of contra proferentem have any place in this debate,
since, after all, Warsaw considerations are contractual considera-
tions. As for the question of judicial law making, it is arguable
that the role of the judiciary has been rather simplistically rele-
gated to the background.
The new Convention,4 ' completed in Montreal on May 28,
1999, aimed at replacing the Warsaw Convention. In Article 3 it
provides that the travel document must contain certain informa-
tion, such as the places of departure and destination. However,
it does not insist on physical delivery of the airline ticket. In-
stead, the new Convention provides that any other means that
preserve the information in the ticket may be substituted for the
delivery of the document, provided the carrier offers the passen-
ger a written statement of the information so preserved.4 2 This
provision has obviously been designed to accommodate elec-
tronic ticketing. It is therefore relevant to the commercial exi-
gencies pertaining to current marketing practices and the
airline product where carriers would offer different services in
39 Valerie Kaiser, Comment, Chan v. Korean Airlines, 15 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE
L., 505, 507 (1990).
40 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 91982, 883 F.2d 17
(5th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
41 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air,
ICAO Doc. 9740 (May 28, 1999), reprinted in Multilateral Convention for Interna-
tional Carriage by Air, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 (Treaty)
(Sept. 6, 2000).
42 Id. at art. 3.2.
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apprising their customers of information contained in an airline
ticket.
E. ISSUES OF JURISDICTION
Perhaps the single most important issue in "cybercontracts" is
jurisdiction. Given the World Wide Web and its global applica-
tion, the most compelling question in this regard would pertain
to the transboundary applicability of an Internet contract. On
this question, the most convenient analogy comes from the two
jurisdictions of Canada and the United States. Would an offeror
in Canada, who offers $500 over the Internet for a round trip
between Toronto and Miami, be able to enforce an agreement
concerning a sale against a United States airline at its home base
in Florida? In a Canadian case decided in 1952, the plaintiff
brought a case to the Ontario High Court against an American
radio broadcasting station that was broadcasting allegedly libel-
lous statements, which could be heard over the air waves in Ca-
nada from across the border. The defendant radio station
brought up a motion of dismissal alleging that the Ontario
Court in Canada had no jurisdiction to hear a case against a
party to the action, which was an enterprise based in the United
States.4 3 The Court disagreed, and held:
A person may utter all the defamatory words he wishes without
incurring any civil liability unless they are heard and understood
by a third person. I think it a "startling proposition" to say that
one may, while standing south of the border or cruising in an
aeroplane south of the border, through the medium of modern
sound amplification, utter defamatory matter which is heard in a
Province in Canada north of the border, and not be said to have
published a slander in the Province in which it is heard and un-
derstood. I cannot see what difference it makes whether the per-
son is made to understand by means of the written word, sound-
waves or ether-waves in so far as the matter of proof of publica-
tion is concerned. The tort consists in making a third person
understand actionable defamatory matter.44
In the more recent case of Pindling v. NBC,45 involving an
American television broadcast received in Canada, the Ontario
High Court held that the Prime Minister of the Bahamas was
held entitled to bring the case to Canada instead of the United
43 SeeJenner v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] C.P.R. 87 (Ont. High Ct.).
44 Id. at 98-99.
45 [1984] O.R.2d 58 (Ont. High Ct. J.).
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States. The Pindling decision illustrates well the principle of "fo-
rum shopping," which can be culled from the television context
and applied to the analogous situation of a contract transacted
over the Internet.
The above principle may be derogated only in an instance
where the Court seized of the case could invoke the principle of
forum non conveniens, which allows the transfer of a suit from one
jurisdiction to another that is better placed to hear the case. In
the 1996 case of National Bank of Canada v. Clifford Chance,4 6 in-
volving a Toronto-based firm that had contracted with a law firm
in the United Kingdom, the Canadian courts transferred the
case to the United Kingdom. The case was transferred on the
grounds that the contract concerned a U.K-based project and
the legal advice obtained had been U.K law given by U.K. law-
yers even though the contract was concluded in Toronto. Sup-
pose, for example, that a consumer in Canada makes an offer
over the Internet for a seat on a U.K.-based carrier departing
from the United Kingdom. Based on the Clifford Chance princi-
ple, it would not be unusual for a common-law court to deter-
mine that the applicable jurisdiction would lie with the courts of
the United Kingdom, although the contract itself may have been
concluded in Canada.
There is a dichotomy in the judicial thinking with regard to
cases involving contracts concluded over the Internet. On the
one hand, courts are refusing to bring a person into a jurisdic-
tion purely because he contracted with a business entity based in
that jurisdiction. This approach is illustrated by the 1994 U.S.
decision Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access Inc.4 7 where the
court refused to grant jurisdiction to a New York resident who
had used a Florida-based online network information service
merely to gain access to a database. Similarly, in the famous
1997 case of IDS Life Insurance Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc.4 the court
refused to find jurisdiction in a trademark case solely on the
basis of the defendant's operation of a general-access Web site:
Plaintiffs ask this Court to hold that any defendant who adver-
tises nationally or on the Internet is subject to its jurisdiction. It
cannot plausibly be argued that any defendant who advertises na-
tionally could expect to be haled into Court in any state, for a
cause of action that does not relate to the advertisements. Such
46 [1996] O.R.3d 746 (Ont. Ct.).
47 636 So. 2d. 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).




general advertising is not the type of 'purposeful activity related
to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair,
just or reasonable.'49
In the 1997 case of Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,50 where the de-
fendant operated a passive general-access Web site, the courts
were of the view that to open worldwide jurisdiction merely be-
cause the Internet offered worldwide access would be
anomalous:
Where, as here, defendant has not contracted to sell or actually
sold any goods or services to New Yorkers, a finding of personal
jurisdiction in New York based on an Internet website would
mean that there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide) per-
sonal jurisdiction over anyone and everyone who establishes an
Internet web site. Such nationwide jurisdiction is not consistent
with traditional personal jurisdiction case law nor acceptable to
the Court as a matter of policy.51
The Hearst decision seems to have followed the observation of
a case 52 decided one year earlier where the court held:
Because the Web enables easy world-wide access, allowing com-
puter interaction via the [W]eb to supply sufficient contacts to
establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction
requirement as it currently exists; the Court is not willing to take
this step. Thus, the fact that Fallon has a Web site used by
Californians cannot establish jurisdiction by itself 53
The second line of judicial thinking is the converse to the pre-
vious approach, where courts have imputed to the non-resident
defendant the responsibility for complexities brought about by
the Internet in its universal applicability. Therefore, in Com-
puserve Inc. v. Patterson,5 4 the court held a Texas-based computer
programmer legally responsible for his Ohio-based computer
network online service and found him to be under Ohio law.
Although the defendant had never visited Ohio, he neverthe-
less, was found to be subject to Ohio law on the basis that an
49 Id. at 1268 (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980)) (emphasis
original).
50 No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
51 Id. at *1. For a similar result, see Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414
(9th Cir. 1997) and Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, 999 F. Supp. 636
(E.D. Pa. 1998).
52 McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826 (S.D. Cal.
1996).
53 Id. at 1828.
54 89 F.3d. 1257, 1268-69 (6th Cir. 1996).
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electronic contract had been concluded in Ohio where the de-
fendant was distributing his product.
The principle of universal application ofjurisdiction has been
invoked in other instances where courts have accepted jurisdic-
tion on the basis of sales made to customers through the defen-
dant's Web site,55 solicitation of donations,56 subscribers signed-
up by the defendant for services delivered over the Internet,57 or
follow-on contacts, negotiations, and other dealings in addition
to, and often as a result of, the initial Internet-based communi-
cation.5 8 The common thread running through the fabric of
judicial thinking in this regard is that parties who avail them-
selves of technology to do business in a distant place should not
then be able to escape that place's legal jurisdiction. These
cases are all-embracing, from breach of contract claims to tort,
including trade libel. In several cases, courts have even found
jurisdiction in trademark infringement matters merely on the
basis of a defendant's general-access Web site 59 or linking to a
55 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass.
1997). See also Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997), where a court
took jurisdiction based on telephone and e-mail communications that consum-
mated a business relationship begun over Prodigy's "Money Talk" discussion fo-
rum for financial matters. In partially justifying this decision, the court noted
that the use of fax technology, and even live telephone conferences, can greatly
reduce the burden of litigating out-of-state.
56 See Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
57 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
58 See Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Cont'l Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-
M/S, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3523 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997). The Court in this case was
not concerned that the defendants had never visited the forum state in person.
"Neither is the matter disposed of by the fact that no defendant ever set foot in
Indiana. The 'footfalls' were not physical, they were electronic. They were,
nonetheless, footfalls. The level of Internet activity in this case was significant."
Id. at *12. See also EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp.
413 (D. Ariz. 1996). In EDIAS, the court summed up the essence of many of the
Internet jurisdiction cases by stating, "BASIS [the defendant] should not be per-
mitted to take advantage of modem technology through an Internet Web page
and forum and simultaneously escape traditional notions of jurisdiction." Id. at
420. See also Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997).
59 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Maritz,
Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). In the latter case the
court observed:
In the present case, Instruction has directed its advertising activities
via the Internet and its toll-free number toward not only the state of
Connecticut, but to all states. The Internet as well as toll-free num-
bers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses
in every state. Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many as
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national automatic teller machine (ATM) network through a
telephone line indirectly through an independent data proces-
sor in a third state. 60
An overall evaluation of the U.S. civil cases discussed above
concludes that while the general trend is for courts to assert ju-
risdiction over non-residents based on their Internet activities,
there are still a few situations where some courts may not apply
jurisdiction.
Although the choice of forum may extend universally, it does
not necessarily mean that enforcement from a judgment would
automatically follow. In the case of Bachchan v. India Abroad Pub-
lications Inc.,61 the plaintiff, a national of India who had won the
right to have his case heard in the United Kingdom, was unable
to enforce judgment in New York. The New York court held
that the applicable U.K. law did not accord with U.S. law, and
therefore, the decision could not be recognized as enforceable
in the United States.
III. CONCLUSION
A distinct advantage of using e-commerce in the sale of airline
tickets is the facility afforded to airlines to caution possible cli-
ents of the hazards of air travel through the Internet. For in-
stance, when a detailed contract of carriage is posted on the
Internet, constituting effective delivery of the contract of car-
riage in accordance with established law, airlines could, at the
same time, bring to the attention of the passenger such hazards
of travel as the aerotoxic syndrome-the causing of blood clots
in the human body through sustained seating in restricted
spaces-and turbulence, by explicitly cautioning travelers of
these dangers through their Web sites and through Web sites
dedicated to such specific issues. This would not only ensure
that adequate notice is given to air travelers of such hazards, but
also would effectively preclude possible actions against airlines
for nondisclosure of material facts in personal injury cases.
10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further, once
posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the
advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user. ISI
has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business within Connecticut.
Id. at 165.
60 See Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo.
1992).
61 585 N.Y.S.2d. 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
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On the minus side, operators of Web sites have to exercise
caution to avoid being hauled into any jurisdiction in the event
of adjudication. The airline that sells its seats over the Internet
is no exception. The first thing an airline must address with
their possible clients over the Internet is the need to establish an
explicit agreement prescribing applicable or governing law with
regard to the agreement and an agreed jurisdiction in case of
dispute. The airlines must also set out, as a condition, the types
of persons with whom it will not enter into contract (such as
persons whose geographic location may not offer the airline
benefit from the contract). The bottom line is that airlines,
which advertise their seats for sale on the Internet, should have
well thought-out, well-drafted conditions of contract, which the
offeror must read carefully and indicate agreement with them,
before he makes his offer.
